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PREFACE 
Around the turn of the century the neo-Kantian socialist Hermann 
Cohen wrote in his Introduction and Critical Epilogue to Friedrich 
Albert Lange's History of Materialism that Kant "is the true and real 
originator of German socialism."1 His claim, of course, is not to be 
taken too literally. After all, Kant to a large extent defended the 
minimal state and accepted the emerging capitalist market econ-
omy, whereas socialists have typically rejected both. Rather, the 
point of Cohen's challenging statement is that Kant's practical phi-
losophy contains moral and philosophical-historical insights cru-
cial to socialist thought and that his notion of the highest good, or 
moral society of colegislators who seek to enhance one another's 
ends, can be extrapolated to set forth the demand for the socialist 
ideal. Thus the statement suggests a conception of socialism that is 
ethical in nature and involves not a mere denial of liberal thought 
but rather its critical extension in the form of economic democracy. 
A final aspect of Cohen's claim which needs to be stressed is its 
implicit criticism of Marx on the grounds that a morally defensible 
socialism is an ethical socialism and that the philosophical founda-
tions of a tenable socialism are to be sought in Kant, not in Hegel. 
These issues are the focus of the present study. In Part One, I 
offer a critical reconstruction of the central role in Kant's work of 
the duty to promote the highest good as a social duty, arguing that 
this duty is to be interpreted as comprising the moral requirement 
that we seek the republican state and international peace. Thus I 
place politics, history, social conflict, and the moral commitment to 
change society at the core of Kant's practical philosophy, attempt-
ing to undercut the view of his ethics as primarily concerned with 
the struggle between individual duty and inclination. Although 
my reconstruction in its basic orientation is influenced by Cohen 
and the Kant interpretation of the Marburg School in general, I 
present a new systematic examination of the social dimension in 
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Kant's practical philosophy, taking into account much current liter-
ature on or relevant to this topic. It is my hope that this reconstruc-
tion will be judged not only in terms of its possible significance for 
socialist thought but also in terms of its discussion of elements of 
Kant's practical philosophy which presently receive insufficient 
philosophical attention. 
In Part Two, I turn to Cohen's transformation of Kant's ethics 
into a socialist ethics. My discussion aims to show that Cohen's 
social and moral thought has been unjustly neglected ever since it 
was effectively repressed by the wave of racist and fascist philoso-
phy in the 1920s and '30s in Germany. I examine his practical work 
in some detail, emphasizing his idea that the socialist society of 
producer cooperatives instantiates, or best approximates, the moral 
ideal of the community of colegislators. My study ends by offering 
an extensive Kantian analysis and critique of Marx's view of moral-
ity, concluding that Marxist thought can greatly profit from making 
Kantian ethics its moral foundation. In a word, I argue that this is a 
tenable enterprise, because Marx and Kantian socialist ethics share 
a common basic evaluative outlook, and a much needed enterprise 
because, much to the damage of the socialist cause, Marx denied 
that action toward the socialist ideal must be a moral praxis. Here 
again my approach is not historical; the major exception to this is 
my discussion of Cohen's perceptive critique of Marx's materialist 
conception of history. My main reason for taking this approach is 
that the Kantian socialists and their critics at the time were un-
familiar with a large part of the Marxian corpus, such as the Eco-
nomic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. I have added, however, 
an appendix with a historical note on Kantian ethical socialism, in 
the expectation that this may contribute to a better understanding 
of some of the philosophical and political concerns expressed in 
the text. 
That the duty to promote the highest good is to be understood 
as a social duty is also argued by Yirmiahu Yovel in his Kant and 
the Philosophy of History. Notwithstanding some essential inter-
pretative disagreements, my study is greatly indebted to his work. 
Our objectives, however, are quite different. Yovel's main purpose 
is to elucidate history as a fundamental category in Kant's critical 
system as a whole, whereas my primary aim (in Part One) is not 
only to expose but also to assess critically and develop further the 
ramifications of Kant's idea that the highest good sets a moral task 
for humanity. Thus I do not hesitate to make explicit what is merely 
implicit in Kant's practical writings, adding my own arguments 
where necessary, and even to traverse roads he hinted at but never 
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took. An example of the former is my argument that the duty to 
promote the highest good can be derived from the different for-
mulations of the categorical imperative. An example of the latter is 
my discussion of a variety of moral problems that arise from Kant's 
turn to the idea of historical progress for the sake of praxis aimed 
at the highest good, such as the question whether we can uphold 
the dignity experienced in the fulfillment of our social duties once 
we realize that future generations may hold that our efforts fell 
short of the ideal because they may have a different conception of 
the demands of the moral law. To give one more illustration, I 
argue that although Kant's notion of respect for the moral law does 
not capture the emotive components of the moral commitment 
(the "good will") to change society, it is nonetheless the case that 
his theory of moral feeling offers an adequate conceptual appara-
tus for examining some emotive elements of this type of commit-
ment which are mentioned but not analyzed in his historical writ-
ings, such as moral indignation about present social conditions 
and moral enthusiasm engendered by progressive political events. 
These examples, it may be noted, underline the reconstructive na-
ture of my Kant discussion and also illustrate that Kant's ethics is 
important for ethical socialism as a philosophy of praxis. 
In the course of this discussion I occasionally criticize some 
aspects of other Kant interpretations. These criticisms take on two 
basic forms that should not be confused: strong and weak claims. 
A strong claim in this context is the contention that a certain author 
misinterprets what I consider to be Kant's view. The point of my 
strong claims is, of course, to raise interesting problems and ques-
tions for my own reconstruction. A weak claim is here to be under-
stood as an argument that a certain author fails to recognize that 
the Kantian text contains another relevant reading besides the one 
he or she in fact offers. It goes without saying that my choice to 
elaborate precisely this other possible reading reflects my purpose 
of developing Kant's practical philosophy as a crucial step toward 
an adequate Kantian socialist ethics. This raises the following 
question: Why did Kant not take the direction that I, all things 
considered, think he should have taken? Or, to put the matter 
more bluntly, why did Kant not become an ethical socialist, not in 
word but in spirit? In addressing the reasons for his different 
philosphical and political orientation I use in effect the same kind 
of distinctions and selection criteria that guide my criticisms of 
various Kant interpretations. Thus I argue, for instance, that Kant's 
nearly total rejection of all forms of political resistance is incon-
sistent on his own terms (a strong claim), and I maintain that the 
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basic premises of his doctrine of the highest good do not necessi-
tate his view that the moral society itself cannot be institutionally 
expressed and must be seen as an "inner" unification of good wills 
(a weak claim). Both strong and weak claims play, moreover, a role 
in my discussion of his commitment to the minimal state and 
capitalist economy. And again, the scope and intent of my crit-
icisms is ultimately circumscribed by my over-all aim of construct-
ing a viable Kantian socialist ethics. 
My final preliminary comment concerns my argument 
throughout this study that morality, with its motivational, correc-
tive (placing moral constraints upon social action), and directive 
(steering this action toward proper ideals) functions, is a sine qua 
non for a defensible socialist theory and praxis. This argument 
must not be equated, as many Marxists tend to do, with some kind 
of voluntaristic plea, whistling democratic socialism in the capital-
ist darkness. Mediation is important, as I stress at several points in 
the text, and the question must be addressed how under the pres-
ent social and political circumstances socialist values can be pro-
moted and realized. The primary task of a philosophical study, 
however, is to raise the question, not to answer it. 
* * * * 
This study owes more to my teacher and friend Steven S. 
Schwarzschild than I have been able to express in my notes to his 
work. He initiated my interest in Kantian socialism, strongly influ-
enced my Kant interpretation, and gave his expertise and commit-
ment to the execution and completion of this study. I would like to 
express my deep gratitude for his generous assistance. I would 
also like to thank Edward F. McClennen, whose incisive comments 
contributed to improving the first chapter. Sidney Morgenbesser 
and Thomas W. Pogge were so kind as to send literature relevant 
to my study, and their perceptive comments and suggestions were 
very helpful in writing its final version. My discussions with 
Daniel E. Wueste were a stimulus to sharpening my own Kantian 
viewpoint. Thanks also go to my parents, as well as to Rita Adler, 
Robert B. Barrett, Scott Bodfish, Claude J. Evans, Stanley L. 
Paulson, and Carl P. Wellman for their encouraging words and 
various other forms of support. 
I am pleased to acknowledge financial support for this study 
from both the Humanities Division Faculty Development Fund 
and the Research Council at Colgate University. I would like to 
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thank Leigh S. Cauman for her fine editorial work and for her 
generous preparedness to deal with various delays. Finally, I am 
very greatful to Anne van der Linden for her patience in working 
through all the drafts of this study, easing my at times painful 
transition from Dutch to English as my medium of philosophical 
expression. 
Hamilton, New York 
August1987 
Harry van der Linden 
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